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Abstract
We study centipede games played by an infinite sequence of players. Following the
literature on time–inconsistent preferences, we distinguish two types of decision makers,
naive and sophisticated, and the corresponding solution concepts, naive –equilibrium
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1 Introduction
We study centipede games played by an infinite sequence of players. Each player is active
only once. The active player can choose either to stop the game or to continue. As soon as
the active player chooses to stop, the game ends.
One of the main application areas of our model concerns the vast literature on decision
making with time–inconsistent preferences. It is customary (Strotz (1955), Pollak (1968),
Peleg and Yaari (1973), Goldman (1979)) to model a decision maker with time–inconsistent
preferences as consisting of a sequence of multiple selves, where day t self makes a decision
on behalf of the decision maker on day t. This leads to a game played by an infinite sequence
of players.
In their well-known paper Doing it now or later, O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) consider
a decision maker who has to decide when to execute a certain task. One important feature
of their model is an exogenous deadline: once the deadline is reached, the decision maker has
no choice but to execute the task. This model can be seen as a finite centipede game and
is a special case of our more general model. In our model, the decision maker may have the
option to never quit, whence the title of our paper.
Following the literature on decision making with time–inconsistent preferences, we distin-
guish two types of decision makers, naive and sophisticated, and examine the corresponding
two types of solution concepts.
A naive decision maker acts under the erroneous assumption that his current self controls
all future decisions in the game. Thus a naive decision maker intends to follow a strategy that
maximizes his payoff over the entire continuation game, but in reality he only carries out the
first action. This happens because the strategy that is optimal for the current self need not
be optimal for future selves. This behavior is captured by the concept of naive equilibrium.
A sophisticated decision maker, in contrast, is fully aware that his day t self only controls
the decision on day t, and that the future selves have different preferences. Thus in a sophisti-
cated equilibrium each self of the decision maker best responds to the strategies of the future
selves. Hence a sophisticated equilibrium is essentially the subgame perfect equilibrium of
the game played by the selves of the decision maker “against” each other.
An example given in Flesch, Kuipers, Mashiah-Yaakovi, Schoenmakers, Solan, and Vrieze
(2010), discussed in detail in the following section, shows that in general a sophisticated
equilibrium need not exist. This motivates us to consider more permissive solution concepts:
naive –equilibrium and sophisticated –equilibrium. A naive -equilibrium is strategy profile
with the property that every player’s strategy can be supported with a belief that makes this
strategy and belief combination -optimal. In a sophisticated –equilibrium each player is
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assumed to play an -best response to the strategies of the subsequent players.
Our results are as follows. We show that for each  > 0 there exists both a naive –
equilibrium and a sophisticated –equilibrium. These existence results rely on mixed strate-
gies. If we assume that each player’s payoff function is upper semicontinuous, then there
exist both a naive 0-equilibrium in pure strategies and a sophisticated 0-equilibrium in pure
strategies.
Herings and Rohde (2006) and Luttmer and Mariotti (2006) consider how time-inconsistent
decision makers interact in a market environment and give sufficient conditions for equilib-
rium existence. Nevertheless, Gabrieli and Ghosal (2013) point out that under standard
assumptions equilibria may fail to exist in such environments. The heart of the problem is
the satiation of the induced preferences of sophisticated decision makers, and the examples of
non-existence are robust. On the contrary, the equilibrium existence issues taken up in this
paper are at the level of the individual decision maker rather than the interaction between
decision makers and existence problems can be solved by notions of -equilibrium.
One of the key results in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) is that a sophisticated decision
maker executes a task earlier than a naive decision maker. We provide a counterpart of this
result in our setup. We show that for a given sophisticated -equilibrium there exists a naive
-equilibrium with the probability of stopping not higher than in the given sophisticated -
equilibrium. Conversely, given a naive -equilibrium there is a sophisticated -equilibrium
with the probability of stopping not smaller than in the given naive -equilibrium.
Apart from the literature on time–inconsistent decision making, our results contribute
to the literature on the existence of subgame perfect –equilibrium in perfect information
games, see e.g. Flesch et al. (2010), Purves and Sudderth (2011), and De Pril, Flesch,
Kuipers, Schoenmakers, and Vrieze (2014). For the most part, this literature focuses on
games with finitely many players. In contrast, here we consider a class of games played by
infinitely many players.
Related to the infinite centipede games as considered here are so–called stopping games,
see Solan (2005) and Mashiah-Yaakovi (2009). These are dynamic games where at each
period of time each player can choose to stop or to continue. Our work is also related to
intergenerational games, where there is a sequence of players such that each player represents
an entire generation, see Phelps and Polak (1968) and Balbus, Jas´kiewicz, and Nowak (2015).
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the so–called procrastination
game. The game serves to illustrate some of the non–trivial aspects of our analysis and
to motivate the need for the solution concepts of naive –equilibrium and sophisticated –
equilibrium. In Section 3, we introduce the general model and define naive and sophisticated
–equilibria. In Section 4, we focus on a special class of games in which the payoffs are
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upper semi-continuous, and show the existence of naive 0-equilibrium and sophisticated 0-
equilibrium in pure strategies. In Section 5, we examine the existence of naive -equilibrium
and, in Section 6, the existence of sophisticated -equilibrium. In Section 7, we compare the
stopping probabilities of naive and sophisticated decision makers and show that sophisticated
decision makers stop earlier.
2 The Procrastination Game
Consider a decision maker who contemplates quitting smoking. On any given day the deci-
sion maker prefers quitting tomorrow to quitting today, and prefers quitting today to never
quitting. This is an example of a decision maker with time–inconsistent preferences: quitting
on day 2 is the best option from the perspective of day 1, but it is no longer the best option
once it is considered on day 2 itself.
Following the standard approach to modeling time–inconsistent preferences, we represent
the decision maker by a sequence of different selves, where day t self makes a decision on behalf
of the decision maker on day t. This leads us to the following game tree, where S (stop) stands
for quitting smoking and C (continue) represents the option to postpone quitting:
S S S S
CCC
 10
...


2
1
0
...


2
2
1
0
...


2
2
2
1
0
...

(
0
...
)
1 2 3 4
Figure 1: Procrastination game.
For the sake of concreteness we choose the following numerical values for the payoffs: the
day t self of the decision maker obtains a payoff of 1 if the decision maker quits on day t, a
payoff of 2 if the the decision maker quits on any day k > t, and 0 in all other situations, so in
particular if the decision maker never quits. We refer to this situation as the Procrastination
game. O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) consider a decision maker who has to decide when to
execute a task such as quitting smoking. One important feature of their model is an exogenous
deadline: once the deadline is reached, the decision maker has no choice but to execute the
task. In contrast, the decision maker acting in the procrastination game above has the option
to never quit. Our general model as detailed in the following section captures both cases with
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and without an exogenous deadline.
Whether the decision maker quits, and if so, when, depends on his type. Following much
of the literature on time–inconsistent decision making we distinguish two types of decision
makers: naive and sophisticated.
A naive decision maker acts under the erroneous assumption that his current self controls
all future decisions in the game. Thus a naive decision maker intends to follow a strategy that
maximizes his payoff over the entire continuation game, but in reality only carries out the
first action. In the procrastination game, this behavior implies never quitting as the decision
maker always intends to quit later.
A sophisticated decision maker, in contrast, is fully aware that his day t self only controls
the decision on day t, and that future selves have different preferences. In the literature, this
behavior is captured by the concept of sophisticated equilibrium, which essentially is nothing
but a subgame perfect equilibrium of the game with multiple selves.
Somewhat surprisingly, the procrastination game has no sophisticated equilibrium in pure
strategies, a fact already noticed (without proof) in Flesch et al. (2010), who introduced
this game to show that properties of games with infinitely many players can be substantially
different from those having finitely many players. For the sake of completeness, we give a
short argument.
Claim 2.1. The Procastination game has no sophisticated equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that there is a sophisticated equilibrium in pure
strategies. We distinguish three cases and derive a contradiction in each case. Let I be the
set of players who choose action S conditional on reaching their decision nodes.
Case 1: Each player plays action C, so each player receives a payoff of 0. Player 1 would
get a payoff of 1 by deviating to S.
Case 2: Exactly one player, say player t, chooses S. Since players t + 1, t + 2, . . . do not
belong to I, player t+1 receives a payoff of 0 in the subgame starting in time t+1. A deviation
to S gives player t+ 1 a payoff of 1.
Case 3: There exist two distinct players, say t1 and t2, who are elements of I. Without
loss of generality, suppose t1 < t2. In the subgame starting in time t1, player t1 receives a
payoff of 1 but he would get 2 by deviating to C.
We show in Claim 6.1 that the procrastination game has no sophisticated equilibrium
even when mixed strategies are considered. Non–existence of a sophisticated equilibrium
in the procrastination game motivates us to consider approximate solution concepts: naive
–equilibrium and sophisticated –equilibrium. Under both concepts, the decision maker is
assumed to maximize his payoff up to a margin of . As we demonstrate in Section 6, the
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procrastination game does have a sophisticated –equilibrium for each positive , namely the
strategy profile whereby each self stops with probability .
3 The General Model
In this section, we describe infinite centipede games and define two solution concepts: naive
-equilibrium and sophisticated -equilibrium.
In an infinite centipede game G, the set of players is the set N of natural numbers and the
set of actions is A = {C, S}, where C stands for continue and S stands for stop. The game
is played as follows. At time 1, player 1 chooses an action. If he chooses action S, then the
game ends. If he chooses action C, then the play proceeds to time 2 where player 2 chooses
an action. This is repeated as long as players choose action C. The payoff for player i ∈ N is
ait if the game ends at time t and a
i∞ if no one plays action S. We assume that payoffs are
uniformly bounded, i.e.,
B = sup
i∈N
sup
t∈N∗
|ait| <∞, (1)
where N∗ stands for N ∪ {∞}. By using the vector notation at = (ait)i∈N for every t ∈ N∗, a
centipede game can be represented as in Figure 2.
S S S S
CCC
a1 a2 a3 a4
a∞
1 2 3 4
Figure 2: An infinite centipede game.
A strategy for player i is a probability distribution σi on the set of actions {C, S}. The
interpretation is that, if time i is reached, then σi recommends to play C with probability
σi(C) and to play S with probability σi(S). The set of strategies for player i is denoted by
Σi and the set of strategy profiles is denoted by Σ = i∈NΣi. A strategy σi of player i is
uniquely specified by the probability to stop, σi(S). Hence Σi can be identified with [0, 1],
and Σ can be identified with [0, 1]N.
A strategy σi is called pure if either σi(S) = 0 or σi(S) = 1. Hence a pure strategy is an
element of {0, 1} and a pure strategy profile is an element of {0, 1}N.
Let σ be a strategy profile. The expected utility of player i, conditional on the game not
being stopped before time t, is denoted by ui(σ|t) and can be calculated as:
ui(σ|t) = σt(S) · ait +
∞∑
k=t+1
σk(S)
k−1∏
j=t
σj(C) · aik +
∞∏
j=t
σj(C) · ai∞.
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Note that ui(σ|i+ 1) is the expected utility of player i when player i plays action C at time i.
We now define the concept of naive -equilibrium.
Definition 3.1. Let  ≥ 0. A strategy profile τ∗ ∈ Σ is called a naive -equilibrium if there
exists a sequence (τi)i∈N of strategy profiles satisfying the following two conditions:
1. τ∗,i = τ ii for every player i ∈ N,
2. ui(τi|i) ≥ ui(σ|i)−  for every player i ∈ N and every strategy profile σ ∈ Σ.
A naive 0-equilibrium is simply called a naive equilibrium.
The idea behind Definition 3.1 originates with the literature on time–inconsistent decision
making. Thus suppose that, as in the procrastination game of the previous section, player i
represents the day i self of a decision maker. The strategy profile τi can then be thought of
as the complete course of actions that the day i self intends to carry out. Condition 2 says
that τi is an –optimal strategy profile in the continuation game when evaluated against day
i’s preferences.
The decision maker is naive as he fails to realize that his day i self only controls the
decision on day i, and that the strategy profile τi need not be –optimal for the future selves.
As a result, the sequence of strategies that the naive decision maker actually carries out is
(τ11 , τ
2
2 , . . . ). This sequence is exactly τ
∗ by Condition 1 of Definition 3.1. Thus τ∗ could be
thought of as the realized behavior of a naive decision maker.
Naive –equilibrium could also be interpreted without a recourse to time–inconsistent
decision making. It represents a situation in which player i fails to take into account the fact
that he only controls a single decision node at time i, subsequent decisions being taken by
other players.
For each player i ∈ N, we define Ai = {aii, aii+1, . . .} ∪ {ai∞}, which is the set of possible
payoffs for player i conditional on the fact that no player stopped the game before him. Also,
we let
M i = supAi. (2)
With this notation, Condition 2 of Definition 3.1 is equivalent to
ui(τi|i) ≥M i −  for every player i ∈ N. (3)
As an illustration, consider the Procrastination game in Figure 1. In this game, M i = 2
for each player i. It can be verified that the naive -equilibria are exactly those strategy
profiles τ∗ for which τ∗,i(C) ≥ 1−  for each player i.
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Definition 3.2. Let  ≥ 0. A strategy profile σ∗ ∈ Σ is called a sophisticated -equilibrium
if for each player i ∈ N and each strategy σi ∈ Σi:
ui(σ∗|i) ≥ ui((σi, σ∗,−i)|i)− .
A sophisticated 0-equilibrium is simply called a sophisticated equilibrium.
A sophisticated decision maker is fully aware that his day i self only controls the decision
on day i and that the future selves may have different preferences. Thus in a sophisticated
–equilibrium each self of the decision maker –best responds to the strategies of the future
selves. Hence a sophisticated –equilibrium is essentially a subgame perfect –equilibrium of
the game.
If player i’s opponents play according to σ∗,−i and player i chooses action C at time i, then
his payoff is ui(σ∗|i+ 1), whereas if player i chooses action S, then his payoff is aii. Hence, a
strategy profile σ∗ is a sophisticated -equilibrium if and only if σ∗ satisfies the following two
inequalities for every player i:
ui(σ∗|i) ≥ ui(σ∗|i+ 1)− , (4)
ui(σ∗|i) ≥ aii − . (5)
In our illustrative example, the Procrastination game in Figure 1, there is no sophisticated
-equilibrium in pure strategies for  ∈ [0, 1) as we will show in Section 6. On the other hand,
we will provide a proof that this game does admit a sophisticated -equilibrium in mixed
strategies, where each player stops with probability .
4 Existence of Equilibrium in the Upper Semicontinuous Case
In this section, we establish the existence of naive and sophisticated equilibria if the payoffs
in the game are upper semi-continuous, i.e., if for every player i ∈ N
lim sup
t→∞
ait ≤ ai∞. (6)
First, we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of naive equilibrium
without continuity assumptions on the payoffs.
Theorem 4.1. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) For every player i ∈ N, the set Ai = {aii, aii+1, . . .} ∪ {ai∞} has a maximum.
(ii) There exists a naive equilibrium in pure strategies.
(iii) There exists a naive equilibrium.
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Proof. (i → ii) Consider a player i. If the maximum of Ai is ai∞, then let τi be the pure
strategy profile that always chooses action C. If the maximum of Ai is not ai∞, but some
ait with t ∈ N, then let τi be the pure strategy profile that always chooses action C, except
at time t, where it chooses action S. It is clear that the pure strategy profile τ∗ defined by
τ∗,i = τ ii for every i ∈ N is a naive equilibrium.
(ii→ iii) Obvious.
(iii→ i) Suppose that there exists a naive equilibrium. Take a player i. By (3), there exists
a strategy profile τi such that u
i(τi|i) ≥ M i. It follows from (2) that ui(τi|i) = M i and that
there exists a t ∈ {i, i+1, . . .}∪{∞} such that ait = M i. Thus, the set Ai has a maximum.
In view of the above theorem, a naive equilibrium does not always exist. A concrete
example is the game in Figure 3, which we will consider later. However, we have the following
existence result for games with upper semicontinuous payoffs.
Theorem 4.2. There exists a naive equilibrium in pure strategies if the payoffs are upper
semicontinuous.
Proof. Due to (6), the set Ai = {aii, aii+1, . . .} ∪ {ai∞} has a maximum for every player i ∈ N.
Therefore, by Theorem 4.1, there exists a naive equilibrium in pure strategies.
Now we turn to the existence of a sophisticated equilibrium. The proof of the following
result employs a truncation approach similar to that in Fudenberg and Levine (1983). One
crucial difference however is that we do not assume the payoffs to be continuous, but only
upper semicontinuous.
Theorem 4.3. There exists a sophisticated equilibrium in pure strategies if the payoffs are
upper semicontinuous.
Proof. Consider a centipede game G. For every T ∈ N, we define the T -period truncated
game GT which is identical to G except for one modification: if all players 1, . . . , T choose
to continue, then, regardless of future play, the payoff of each player i ∈ N is equal to aiT+1.
Since the payoffs cannot change after time T , this game is essentially a T -period game.
For every T ∈ N, the truncated game GT admits a pure sophisticated equilibrium σT in
which σiT (S) = 1 for every player i ≥ T + 1. Indeed, due to the payoffs in GT , we can set
σiT (S) = 1 for every player i ≥ T + 1 and then determine σTT (S), . . . , σ1T (S) by backward
induction. If a player is indifferent between playing action C and action S then either action
can be taken. The set of pure strategy profiles, as mentioned earlier, can be identified with
the infinite Cartesian product {0, 1}N and is thus a compact metrizable topological space.
Hence the sequence (σT )
∞
T=1 has an accumulation point σ¯ ∈ {0, 1}N. By taking a subsequence
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if necessary, we can assume that (σT )
∞
T=1 converges to the strategy profile σ¯. We distinguish
two cases.
Case 1: Suppose that there are only finitely many players who play action S in the strategy
profile σ¯. So, there exists a time t such that for all players i ≥ t, σ¯i(C) = 1. We prove that
σ¯ induces a sophisticated equilibrium for the subgame of G starting at time t. So we need to
show that ui(σ¯|i) ≥ aii for all i ≥ t. For every i, T ∈ N, let
miT = min{k ≥ i|σkT (S) = 1},
so miT is the first player at time i or later who stops in the strategy profile σT . We have for
every i ≥ t that
ui(σ¯|i) = ai∞ (7)
≥ lim sup
T→∞
aiT (8)
≥ lim sup
T→∞
aimiT
(9)
= lim sup
T→∞
ui(σT |i) (10)
≥ aii. (11)
Equality (7) holds, since no one stops from time t onwards in the strategy profile σ¯; (8)
follows from the assumption of the theorem; (9) follows from the definition of limit superior,
because miT → ∞ as T → ∞, for every i ≥ t; (10) holds as ui(σT |i) = aimiT for every i and
T ; and finally (11) is true since σT is a sophisticated equilibrium in GT . Hence, we have
ui(σ¯|i) ≥ aii for all i ≥ t, as desired. This means that σ¯ induces a sophisticated equilibrium
for the subgame of G starting at time t. Now we can use backward induction from time t to
obtain a sophisticated equilibrium in G.
Case 2 : Suppose that there are infinitely many players who play action S in the strategy
profile σ¯. Take an arbitrary player i. Let
ni = min{k > i|σ¯k(S) = 1},
so ni is the first player at time i+1 or later who stops in the strategy profile σ¯. Since (σT )
∞
T=1
converges to σ¯, there exists T ≥ ni such that for all j ≤ ni we have σjT = σ¯j . Because σT is a
sophisticated equilibrium in the game GT , player i does not have a profitable deviation from
σT in GT . It follows that player i does not have a profitable deviation from σ¯ in the game G.
We conclude that σ¯ is a sophisticated equilibrium of G.
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5 Existence of Naive -Equilibrium
We know from the previous section that a naive equilibrium does not always exist. The
following theorem deals with the existence of naive -equilibrium.
Theorem 5.1. For every  > 0, there exists a naive -equilibrium in pure strategies.
Proof. Let  > 0 be given. Consider a player i. We distinguish two cases in order to define a
pure strategy profile τi.
Case 1: ai∞ ≥ M i − , where M i is given in (2). In this case, let τi be the pure strategy
profile that always chooses action C.
Case 2: ai∞ < M i − . In this case, there exists t ∈ {i, i + 1, . . .} such that ait ≥ M i − .
Let τi be the pure strategy profile that always chooses action C, except at time t, where it
chooses action S.
Now define the pure strategy profile τ∗ by setting τ∗,i = τ ii for every player i ∈ N. Then,
the strategy profiles τ∗ and τi, for every i ∈ N, satisfy Condition 1 of Definition 3.1 and
inequality (3), so τ∗ is a naive -equilibrium.
As an illustration, consider a game where the payoff for player i ∈ N is 1 − 1t−i+1 if the
game ends at time t > i, and 0 if the game ends at time t ≤ i or if no one stops. The game
is given in Figure 3.
S S S S
CCC
(
0
...
) 
1
2
0
...


2
3
1
2
0
...


3
4
2
3
1
2
0
...

(
0
...
)
1 2 3 4
Figure 3: A game without naive equilibrium.
By Theorem 4.1, there is no naive equilibrium in this game. On the other hand, the pure
strategy profile τ∗ that always chooses action C is a naive -equilibrium for every  > 0.
Indeed, let  > 0. For every player i, take a time ti such that ti > i and a
i
ti ≥ 1 − . Define
τi to be the pure strategy profile that always chooses action C, except at time ti, where it
chooses action S. Then, for every player i ∈ N it holds that τ∗,i = τ ii and inequality (3) is
satisfied, so τ∗ is a naive -equilibrium as claimed.
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6 Existence of Sophisticated -Equilibrium
In this section, we examine the existence of a sophisticated -equilibrium. The following claim
establishes neither a sophisticated equilibrium nor a pure sophisticated -equilibrium.
Claim 6.1. The Procrastination game in Figure 1 has the following properties:
1. It admits no sophisticated -equilibrium in pure strategies for any  ∈ [0, 1).
2. It admits no sophisticated equilibrium.
Proof. First we prove part 1. Take an  ∈ [0, 1) and suppose by way of contradiction that
σ is a sophisticated -equilibrium in pure strategies. Consider some player i ∈ N. For any
pure strategy τ i it holds that ui(σ|i) ≥ ui((τ i, σ−i)|i)− . Because pure strategy profiles can
only induce payoffs 0, 1 or 2 to any player in the game and because  < 1, we must have
ui(σ|i) ≥ ui((τ i, σ−i)|i). Therefore, pure strategy profile σ is a sophisticated equilibrium.
This contradicts Claim 2.1.
Now we prove part 2. Assume to the contrary that σ is a sophisticated equilibrium. For
every player k, let
p(σ|k) =
∞∏
i=k
σi(C)
be the probability that the game never stops, provided that it has not been stopped before
time k and that the players play according to σ.
Assume first that there are two players i and j, with i < j, such that σi and σj are not
pure. Since σi is not pure, we have ui((C, σ−i)|i) = ui((S, σ−i)|i). Note that ui((S, σ−i)|i) = 1
and
ui((C, σ−i)|i) = (1− p(σ|i+ 1)) · 2,
so p(σ|i+ 1) = 0.5. By a similar argument, we obtain for player j that p(σ|j + 1) = 0.5. But
then
p(σ|i+ 1) = σi+1(C)σi+2(C) · · ·σj(C)p(σ|j + 1)
yields σj(C) = 1, which is a contradiction to the fact that σj is not pure.
Therefore, there is a time t such that in the subgame that starts at t, the strategy profile
σ is a sophisticated equilibrium in pure strategies. By backward induction, we can then
construct a sophisticated equilibrium in pure strategies for the whole game. This is however
in contradiction with Claim 2.1.
The main result of this section is the following theorem on the existence of a sophisticated
-equilibrium. Our construction is based on a truncation approach similar to that in Fuden-
berg and Levine (1983), but in our case the payoffs are not necessarily continuous at infinity,
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which requires us to construct a specific type of sophisticated -equilibria in the truncated
games.
Theorem 6.2. For every  > 0, there exists a sophisticated -equilibrium.
Proof. Take a centipede game G. As in the proof of Theorem 4.3, for every T ∈ N we define
the T -period truncated game GT which is identical to G except for one modification: if all
players 1, . . . , T choose to continue, then regardless of future play, the payoff of each player
i ∈ N is equal to aiT+1.
Fix an  > 0. Assume that B as defined in (1) is strictly positive; otherwise the statement
of the theorem is trivial. Choose δ ∈ R such that
0 < δ ≤ min{ 2B , 1}.
Furthermore, we define
Σ∗ = {σ ∈ Σ | for every i ∈ N, σi(S) ∈ {δ, 1}}.
First we show that, for each T ∈ N, the game GT has a sophisticated -equilibrium that
belongs to Σ∗. Then we prove that, as T goes to infinity, these sophisticated -equilibria have
an accumulation point and that every such accumulation point is a sophisticated -equilibrium
of the original game G.
Step 1: We prove that, for each T ∈ N, the game GT has a sophisticated -equilibrium
σ∗T that is an element of Σ
∗.
Let T ∈ N. We now define σ∗T by means of backward induction. Let
σ∗,T+1T (S) = σ
∗,T+2
T (S) = · · · = 1,
and suppose that for some i ∈ {1, . . . , T} the strategies σ∗,i+1T , . . . , σ∗,TT have been defined.
Then the utility of player i in the subgame starting in i + 1 is well-defined and, with some
abuse of notation, is denoted by ui(σ∗T | i+ 1). Now for player i we set
σ∗,iT (S) =
{
1 if ui(σ∗T |i+ 1) ≤ aii
δ if ui(σ∗T |i+ 1) > aii.
Note that the strategy profile σ∗T as defined above belongs to Σ
∗.
Now we show that σ∗T is a sophisticated -equilibrium of GT . It is sufficient to verify (4)
and (5) for players in {1, . . . , T}. Take any player i ∈ {1, . . . , T}. If ui(σ∗T |i + 1) ≤ aii then
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σ∗,iT (S) = 1, so (4) and (5) are satisfied. So assume that u
i(σ∗T |i+ 1) > aii. We have
ui(σ∗T |i) = σ∗,iT (S)aii + (1− σ∗,iT (S))ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)
= δ aii + (1− δ)ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)
= δ(aii − ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)) + ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)
≥ −δ2B + ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)
≥ ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)− .
Hence, inequality (4) is satisfied. Furthermore, it holds that
ui(σ∗T |i)− aii = σ∗,iT (S)aii + (1− σ∗,iT (S))ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)− aii
= (1− σ∗,iT (S))(ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)− aii)
≥ 0,
where the last inequality follows by ui(σ∗T |i+ 1) > aii. Hence, inequality (5) is also satisfied.
Step 2. We prove that, as T goes to infinity, the sophisticated -equilibria σ∗T have an
accumulation point and that every such accumulation point is a sophisticated -equilibrium
of the original game G.
The set Σ∗ can be identified with the infinite Cartesian product {δ, 1}N and is thus a
compact metrizable topological space. Hence, the sequence (σ∗T )
∞
T=1 has an accumulation
point σ∗ ∈ Σ∗. By taking a subsequence if necessary, we can assume that (σ∗T )∞T=1 converges
to the strategy profile σ∗. We will show that the accumulation point σ∗ is a sophisticated
-equilibrium.
To prove that σ∗ is a sophisticated -equilibrium, it is enough to show that, for every
i ∈ N,
lim
T→∞
ui(σ∗T |i) = ui(σ∗|i),
lim
T→∞
ui(σ∗T |i+ 1) = ui(σ∗|i+ 1).
Then, since equations (4) and (5) hold for σ∗T for each T ∈ N, they will also hold for σ∗ and
the proof will be complete.
Let i ∈ N and ′ > 0 be given. We need to find N ∈ N such that for all T ≥ N the
following two inequalities hold:
|ui(σ∗T |i)− ui(σ∗|i)| ≤ ′,
|ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)− ui(σ∗|i+ 1)| ≤ ′.
Take k ∈ N such that k > i and 2B(1− δ)k−i ≤ ′. Since σ∗T converges to σ∗ as T goes to ∞,
we have pointwise convergence for each player, i.e., for every j ∈ N, σ∗,jT converges to σ∗,j as
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T goes to ∞. Therefore, there exists N ∈ N such that N ≥ k and, for every T ≥ N, for every
j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, it holds that σ∗,jT = σ∗,j . Hence, we have, for all T ≥ N,
|ui(σ∗T |i)− ui(σ∗|i)| = σ∗,i(C) · · ·σ∗,k(C) · |ui(σ∗T |k + 1)− ui(σ∗|k + 1)|
≤ 2B(1− δ)k−i+1
≤ 2B(1− δ)k−i
≤ ′,
and
|ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)− ui(σ∗|i+ 1)| = σ∗,i+1(C) · · ·σ∗,k(C) · |ui(σ∗T |k + 1)− ui(σ∗|k + 1)|
≤ 2B(1− δ)k−i
≤ ′.
According to the definition of B in (1), the payoffs are uniformly bounded. One might
wonder whether it would be enough to assume only that the payoffs are bounded for each
player separately. The following example shows that this weaker assumption would not suffice
for the existence of a sophisticated -equilibrium.
Consider the game with the following payoffs for every player i: If the game ends before
time i then player i’s payoff is 0. If the game ends at time i then player i’s payoff is 2i. If
the game ends after time i then player i’s payoff is 2i+1. Finally, if the game never ends then
player i’s payoff is 0. The game tree is given in Figure 4.
S S S S
CCC
 20
...


4
4
0
...


4
8
8
0
...


4
8
16
16
0
...

(
0
...
)
1 2 3 4
Figure 4: A centipede game without a sophisticated -equilibrium.
It is clear that, for each i ∈ N, sup
t∈N∗
|ait| = 2i+1. At the same time it holds that sup
i∈N
sup
t∈N∗
|ait| =
∞.
Claim 6.3. For each  > 0, the game in Figure 4 admits no sophisticated -equilibrium.
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Proof. Take  > 0 and suppose by way of contradiction that there is a sophisticated -
equilibrium σ for the game in Figure 4. As in the proof of Claim 6.1, let p(σ|k) =∏∞i=k σi(C)
denote the probability that the game never stops, given that it has not stopped before time
k and the players follow the strategy profile σ.
Take a player i ∈ N. Since σ is a sophisticated –equilibrium, inequality (5) implies that
ui(σ|i) ≥ 2i − . On the other hand, since 2i+1 is the highest payoff player i can get and
since he gets 0 if the game never stops, we have the following upper bound on the payoff:
ui(σ|i) ≤ (1− p(σ|i)) · 2i+1 + p(σ|i) · 0. Combining these facts and rearranging terms, we find
that
p(σ|i) ≤ 1
2
+

2i+1
.
Notice that the sequence {p(σ|i)}i∈N is non–decreasing and bounded and hence has a limit.
Furthermore, the preceding inequality implies that
lim
i→∞
p(σ|i) ≤ 1
2
.
Consider any player i ∈ N. For each j > i it holds that
p(σ|i) =
∞∏
t=i
σt(C) =
j−1∏
t=i
σt(C) · p(σ|j).
Taking the limit as j approaches infinity, we obtain
p(σ|i) = lim
j→∞
j−1∏
t=i
σt(C) · lim
j→∞
p(σ|j) = p(σ|i) · lim
j→∞
p(σ|j) ≤ p(σ|i) · 1
2
,
which implies that p(σ|i) = 0.
Thus for each i ∈ N it holds that ui(σ|i) = σi(S)·2i+(1−σi(S))·2i+1 and ui(σ|i+1) = 2i+1.
Since σ is a sophisticated –equilibrium, it holds by inequality (4) that ui(σ|i) ≥ ui(σ|i+1)−,
and therefore σi(S) ≤ 2−i.
Now take t ∈ N such that 21−t < 1. Since 1 − p(σ|t) is the probability that the game
eventually stops conditional on time t being reached, we have
1− p(σ|t) =
∞∑
j=t
σj(S)
j−1∏
i=t
σi(C) ≤
∞∑
j=t
σj(S) ≤
∞∑
j=t
2−j ≤ 21−t,
so p(σ|t) ≥ 1− 21−t > 0, contradicting p(σ|t) = 0.
7 Sophisticates Stop Earlier
One of the key results in O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999) is that a sophisticated decision maker
executes a task earlier than a naive decision maker. In this section we derive the counterpart
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of this result in our setup. The comparison of sophisticated and naive decision makers in
our setup is somewhat complicated by the fact that in general there might exist multiple
sophisticated –equilibria and multiple naive –equilibria. We thus have to compare two sets
of equilibria. We achieve this by showing that [1] given a sophisticated –equilibrium there
exists a naive –equilibrium with the probability to stop not greater than in the sophisticated
–equilibrium at any given time, and [2] given a naive –equilibrium there exists a sophisticated
–equilibrium with the probability to stop not smaller than in the naive –equilibrium at any
given time.
Theorem 7.1. For each sophisticated -equilibrium σ∗, there exists a naive -equilibrium τ∗
such that for all i ∈ N, τ∗,i(S) ≤ σ∗,i(S).
Proof. Let σ∗ be a sophisticated -equilibrium. For every i ∈ N, we define the strategy
profile τi ∈ Σ as follows. If ui(σ∗|i) ≥ M i − , then let τi = σ∗. Otherwise, it holds that
ui(σ∗|i) < M i − . As aii −  ≤ ui(σ∗|i) by inequality (5), it then holds that aii < M i.
Consequently, there exists t ∈ {i+ 1, i+ 2, . . . } ∪ {∞} such that ait ≥M i − . If t =∞ then
we define τi by letting τ
j
i (S) = 0 for all j ∈ N, while if t ∈ {i+1, i+2, . . . } we define τ ti (S) = 1
and τ ji (S) = 0 for all j 6= t. It is easy to see that the strategy profile τi satisfies inequality (3).
Now define τ∗ ∈ Σ by letting τ∗,i = τ ii for each i ∈ N. Then τ∗ is a naive –equilibrium. Since
τ∗,i(S) is either equal to σ∗,i(S) or 0, it holds for every i ∈ N that τ∗,i(S) ≤ σ∗,i(S).
Theorem 7.2. For each naive -equilibrium τ∗, there exists a sophisticated -equilibrium σ∗
such that for all i ∈ N, τ∗,i(S) ≤ σ∗,i(S).
Proof. Fix a naive -equilibrium τ∗ and let (τi)i∈N be as in Definition 3.1. For T ∈ N, we
define the truncated game GT as in the proof of Theorem 6.2. Choose δ ∈ R such that
0 < δ ≤ min{ 2B , 1}.
For each i ∈ N, let pii = max{δ, τ∗,i(S)}. Consider the set of strategies
Σ∗∗ = {σ ∈ Σ | for every i ∈ N, σi(S) ∈ {pii, 1}}.
Step 1: We prove that, for each T ∈ N, the game GT has a sophisticated -equilibrium
σ∗T that is an element of Σ
∗∗.
Let T ∈ N. We define σ∗T by backward induction. Let
σ∗,T+1T (S) = σ
∗,T+2
T (S) = · · · = 1
and suppose that for some i ∈ {1, . . . , T}, the strategies σ∗,i+1T ,. . . , σ∗,TT have been defined.
Then the utility of player i in the subgame starting in i + 1 is well-defined and, with some
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abuse of notation, is denoted by ui(σ∗T | i+ 1). For player i we set
σ∗,iT (S) =
{
1 if ui(σ∗T |i+ 1) ≤ aii
pii if ui(σ∗T |i+ 1) > aii.
Note that the strategy profile σ∗T as defined above belongs to Σ
∗∗.
Now we show that σ∗T is a sophisticated -equilibrium of GT . It is sufficient to verify (4)
and (5) for players in {1, . . . , T}.
Take a player i ∈ N. If ui(σ∗T |i + 1) ≤ aii, then σ∗,iT (S) = 1 and (4) and (5) are clearly
satisfied.
Thus, suppose that ui(σ∗T |i+ 1) > aii. In this case it holds that σ∗,iT (S) = pii.
If pii = δ, then
ui(σ∗T |i) = σ∗,iT (S)aii + (1− σ∗,iT (S))ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)
= δ aii + (1− δ)ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)
≥ −δ2B + ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)
≥ ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)− .
If pii = τ∗,i(S), we have the following chain of inequalities:
ui(σ∗T |i)− ui(σ∗T |i+ 1) = σ∗,iT (S)aii + (1− σ∗,iT (S))ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)− ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)
= σ∗,iT (S)(a
i
i − ui(σ∗T |i+ 1))
= τ∗,i(S)(aii − ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)) (12)
≥ τ∗,i(S)(aii −M i) (13)
= τ∗,i(S)aii + (1− τ∗,i(S))M i −M i
≥ τ∗,i(S)aii + (1− τ∗,i(S))ui(τi|i+ 1)−M i (14)
= ui(τi|i)−M i
≥ −, (15)
where equality (12) holds since we assume σ∗,iT (S) = pi
i = τ∗,i(S), inequality (13) holds since
ui(σ∗T |i+ 1) is a probability distribution over the set {aii+1, aii+2, · · · } ∪ {ai∞}, a subset of Ai
and hence bounded above by M i = supAi, inequality (14) follows since ui(τi|i+ 1) is likewise
bounded above by M i, and inequality (15) follows from inequality (3).
Hence, σ∗T satisfies inequality (4).
Moreover, we have
ui(σ∗T |i)− aii = σ∗,iT (S)aii + (1− σ∗,iT (S))ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)− aii
= (1− σ∗,iT (S))(ui(σ∗T |i+ 1)− aii)
≥ 0,
18
so inequality (5) is also satisfied.
Step 2. One proves that the sequence {σ∗T }T∈N has an accumulation point and that every
such accumulation point is a sophisticated -equilibrium of the original game G. This step
follows along the same lines as Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 6.2.
Notice that the Theorems 7.1 and 7.2 do not preclude the possibility that there exist a
naive –equilibrium τ∗ and a sophisticated –equilibrium σ∗ such that τ∗,i(S) > σ∗,i(S) for
all i ∈ N. The trivial game where all payoffs are 0 would yield an example.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we examined infinite centipede games with uniformly bounded payoffs. We
looked at two solution concepts, naive and sophisticated -equilibria, depending on the type
of the decision maker.
Regarding a naive decision maker, we show that there does not always exist a naive 0-
equilibrium. We provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a naive
0-equilibrium and who that upper semicontinuity of payoffs is sufficient for existence. Finally,
we show that a naive -equilibrium always exists, for any  > 0.
For a sophisticated decision maker, we also show that sophisticated equilibrium do not
always exist. We show the existence of a sophisticated 0-equilibrium in pure strategies when
payoffs are upper semicontinuous. Moreover, we show that for every  > 0, there exists a
sophisticated -equilibrium.
We also examine the connection between naive and sophisticated decision makers. We
show that for every sophisticated -equilibrium there exists a naive -equilibrium such that the
stopping probability of every player in the sophisticated -equilibrium strategy is higher than
in the naive -equilibrium strategy. Additionally, we show that for every naive -equilibrium
there exists a sophisticated -equilibrium such that the stopping probability of every player
in the sophisticated -equilibrium strategy is higher than in the naive -equilibrium.
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